This online appendix provides supplemental material for Hegre and Nygård (2014). It proceeds as follows: Section A-1 provides additional information on how the combined governance index used in Hegre and Nygård (2014) is constructed, and reports the relationship between the different subindicators the index consists of. Next, we report summary statistics for all the control variables used in the paper, and describe and discuss how we dealt with missing data.
This online appendix provides supplemental material for Hegre and Nygård (2014) . It proceeds as follows: Section A-1 provides additional information on how the combined governance index used in Hegre and Nygård (2014) is constructed, and reports the relationship between the different subindicators the index consists of. Next, we report summary statistics for all the control variables used in the paper, and describe and discuss how we dealt with missing data.
Section A-2 provides additional information of the logarithmic transformation of the formal institutions index used in the paper, and reports information about the relationship between this index and the overall governance index. Section A-3 shows the relationship between the formal and informal institution indices.
In Hegre and Nygård (2014) we discuss the substantive impact of the overall governance index and several of the sub-indicators on the risk of conflict recurrence. Section A-4 in this appendix show plots for the sub-indicators not covered in the main paper. The substantive results for these sub indicators are identical to those reported for the indicators in the main paper.
Section A-5 reports the full list of fairly fine-grained region dummy variables used as controls in the study, and then the issue of whether the effect of governance on conflict is linear is discussed. Section A-6 shows that this relationship indeed is not strictly linear, but that the deviation from linearity is negligible. Section A-7 provides a set of robustness checks, looking at the extent to which our results are robust to influential observations and different operationalizations of the dependent variable. The last section discusses in more detail how we deal with endogenity in the paper.
A-1 Data
Table A-1 reports summary statistics for the variables included in Hegre and Nygård (2014) . Several of these variables, and especially the governance indicators have substantial amounts of missing data. To a large extent, this 'missingness' is not overlapping and listwise deletion would therefore toss out more than 50 percent of our data. Listwise deletion is only appropriate when missing data is thought to be 'missing completely at random' (MCAR), meaning that the dependent variable is completely unrelated to the missing data mechanism (Little and Rubin 2002) . This is an untenable assumption in our case. We assume therefore that the data is 'missing at random', implying that missing values can be predicted by observed information included in the data set. We perform multiple imputation (Little and Rubin 2002) by using all the information available in the dataset to predict missing values. Multiple imputation solves the problem of taking imputation uncertainty into consideration by producing a set of missing value candidates. The variance across these candidates is then directly interpretable as the imputation uncertainty. We perform multiple imputation using Amelia (Honaker and King 2010, Honaker, King and Blackwell 2011) . In the imputation the time series and panel nature of our data is taken into consideration.
As discussed in Hegre and Nygård (2014) several of the governance indicators are highly correlated. Figure A -1 shows the correlation between each of the sub-indices and the overall governance index.
A-2 Formal political institutions
In Hegre and Nygård (2014) we develop an index for formal political institutions in order to evaluate the effect of governance over and above the effect of such formal institutions. We have based our index of formal political institutions on the 'Scalar Index of Polities' (SIP) developed in Gates et al. (2006) . The SIP index is partly based on the Polity (Marshall n.d.) democracy index, the most widely used dataset on formal political institutions in conflict research. There are several other indices of formal democracy than the Polity and SIP indices used here, but few as detailed as these and with equally long time series. Most democracy indicators correlate highly, and the Polity and SIP scores are both representative as well as widely used in the academic literature. Polity categorizes formal institutions using indicators along three dimensions: Openness and regulation of executive recruitment, openness and regulation of popular participation, and the extent to which the executive branch is balanced by other institutions within the political system. A problem with the Polity index, however, is that the participation component includes political violence as part of the definition (Vreeland 2008) . The SIP index circumvents this problem by replacing the participation component with data from Vanhanen (2000) . The original SIP measure ranges from 0 to 1. The value 0 is given to political systems where the executive is not elected, where either the vast majority of the population has no right to vote or there is no party competition, and no institutions serves as checks and balances on the executive. A value close to 1 is given to systems where the executive is elected, voting rights are universal and party competition effective, and an institution (typically an elected parliament) is equally influential as the executive branch.
We have made one adjustment to the Gates et al. 
A-5 List of Regions
In all tables, we have omitted the estimated coefficients for 23 small regions designed to capture unobserved country/region-level heterogeneity. The regions are listed below. Table A-2 repeats  Table 1 in Hegre and Nygård (2014) with all estimates. The definition of the regions is given in the list that follows. The region dummies were designed to account for unobserved country-level heterogeneity without 'throwing the baby out with the bathwater' (Beck and Katz 2001). They consist of mostly neighboring countries, and were constructed to be as small as possible but always have some variation on the dependent variable within the region. See Hegre and Nordkvelle (N.d.) for validation of this design. 
A-6 Assumption of linear relationship
In Hegre and Nygård (2014) we assume that the relationship between governance and conflict is linear. This, however, may not be the case, and even if the relationship is roughly linear the estimates reported in Hegre and Nygård (2014) may ignore important and interesting local effects as the model only reports the global mean effect of governance on conflict. To investigate this further, we estimate a Generalized Additive Model (Beck and Jackman 1998, Wood 2006) where we allow for a non-linear effect of time in peace, we find that the effect is not strictly linear. The departure from linearity is minor, however, and should not have any major theoretical implications.
The models presented above all assume that the effect of governance on conflict onset or recurrence is linear. Beck and Jackman (1998) show that such linearity assumptions, although common, are not necessarily harmless. To test whether this assumption holds, we fit a Generalized Additive Model (GAM) to the data. GAM models are estimated through non-parametric smoothing so the function relating two variables is not imposed but estimated from the data (Wood 2006). We fit splines to three variables: the governance index, the time in peace variable and the interaction term between the two. Figure A-5 plots the values of the governance and time in peace interaction term On the x axis and the partial effect on conflict recurrence (the effect after having taken the other covariates into consideration) on the y axis. The relationship is not strictly linear, but there are no major tipping points or break points that clearly distinguish some levels of the variable from others. By and large, a linear approximation appears to be valid. The other two terms are also well approximated by a linear function.
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A-7 Robustness tests Influential cases
To ensure the robustness of the results we ran a series of regression diagnostics. In this we focused on the results from Model 8 in Table 1 in Hegre and Nygård (2014). First we checked the model for outliers and influential observations that may drive the results. We examined Pearson residuals and Df-betas, which measure the impact each observation has on the effect of a particular parameter estimate. These diagnostics indicate that China, Tajikistan, Mozambique and Serbia may be unusually influential. We therefore removed these observations and re-estimated the model. This leads to only marginal changes in the estimated effects and the model therefore appears to be robust to outliers.
Definition of dependent variable
To check how sensitive our results are to a different definition of the dependent variable, we reestimated the models in Table 1 in Hegre and Nygård (2014) only looking at conflicts incurring more than 1000 battle related deaths according to the UCDP/PRIO dataset. The results are shown in Table A -3. Most governance indicators are still associated with a lower estimated incidence of armed conflict, despite the fact that there is much less information in the more restrictive dependent variable. For the most serious conflicts, however, good governance seems to reduce the risk of conflict onset, not only recurrence.
A-8 Endogenity
As discussed in the Hegre and Nygård (2014) the relationship between governance and conflict could potentially be endogenous. To investigate this we develop an instrument for governance and run a 2SLS model. The first instrument takes advantage of the fact that a regime change is more likely to be into democracy during a democratic wave, and conversely more likely to be into non-democracy during a reverse wave. Our instrument is the net proportion of changes toward democracy in the year that the current political system was established, as measured in Strand et al. (2012) . This variable is positive if most changes in a year are democratizations, and negative if more countries become more autocratic. For example, the system in effect in Romania in 2000 was established in 1989, a peak year of the third wave of democratization where the net proportion changing toward democracy was 0.25. Knutsen (2011) shows that a similar variable is highly correlated with whether a country's current regime is a democracy, yet still not violating the exclusion criteria, meaning it is exogenous to the current regime type.
The second instrument uses the value for formal institutions index at a time 20 years before the time of observation as a proxy for current governance. Since we do not have data very far back in time for the full governance index, using the 20-year lag of this index is not feasible. The governance index and the formal institutions index are highly correlated (r = 0.75) so using the 20-year lag of the formal institutions index works well as a proxy for the overall governance index. Most conflicts last less than 20 years, so this instrument should be reasonably exogenous to current conflict.
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate an instrumental probit model. Our model includes two variables that need to be instrumented for: the governance variable and the interaction term between governance level and time in current conflict status. 17 The variables are functions of each other, but the algorithm still has to treat two variables as endogenous: governance and governance interacted with time in peace. Standard errors in parentheses Estimation also includes 23 regional dummies, results not shown * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
